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Abstract—The goal of this paper is to propose a blockchain-
based platform to enhance transparency and traceability of
cybersecurity certification information motivated by the recently
adopted EU Cybersecurity Act. The proposed platform is generic
and intended to support the trusted exchange of cybersecurity
certification information for any electronic product, service, or
process. However, for the purposes of this paper, we focus on the
case study of the cybersecurity certification of IoT devices, which
are explicitly referenced in the recently adopted Cybersecurity
Act as one of the main domains where it is highlighted the need
for an increased level of trust.
Index Terms—Security Certification, Internet of Things,
Blockchain
I. INTRODUCTION
The advent of the so-called Internet of Things (IoT) supports
an increasing integration of the physical and digital world
where security and privacy aspects represent significant con-
cerns for companies, institutions and end users due to the
growing use of digital identity and processing of personal
data. Through this trend toward hyperconnectivity, security
issues may not be only associated to a single device but they
can also extend their negative impacts to other devices or
systems. Therefore, there is a need to develop mechanisms
to evaluate and assess the security level provided by IoT
devices and technologies, as highlighted in [1] and [2]. In this
way potential cybersecurity vulnerabilities and attacks can be
detected and mitigated to create more secure and trustworthy
IoT-enabled environments.
As a legal umbrella for security assessment, security certi-
fication has recently emerged as a key tool in establishing a
common framework to increase trust in a digital society. In
this direction, the realization of a cybersecurity certification
framework is nowadays one of the main EU priorities in the
field of cybersecurity. Indeed, the European Commission (EC)
adopted in March 2019 [3] the so-called “Cybersecurity Act”
with the goal of strengthening the role of the European Union
Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA), and
to establish such a framework at EU level that allows the
recognition of certified devices in all Member States.
Related to the development of this framework, other recent
efforts have been initiated to identify the needs and chal-
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lenges to be addressed in the coming years. In particular, the
European Cyber Security Organization (ECSO) has analyzed
the challenges of the industry in the field of cybersecurity
certification, and the set of current alternatives that can be
used as inputs for the definition of a meta-certification scheme
[4]. These issues are exacerbated in the IoT context [5] for
many reasons including the wide deployment of IoT tech-
nologies in the market and its distribution in many different
applications and infrastructures, the dynamic nature, scale
and pervasiveness of IoT technologies, and the demand for
a common platform to keep track on the certification results
of IoT devices and systems. This platform must be flexible
enough to support the variety of different stakeholders in the
IoT market, the different domains where IoT devices can be
deployed, and their different versions and configurations.
While an exhaustive collection of the different challenges
for the definition of a cybersecurity certification framework
can be found in our previous works [6] [7], we focus on
two main aspects that need to be addressed for an effective
certification approach in the IoT context. On the one hand,
the information in the cybersecurity certificate (as a result of
a successful certification process) should include pertinent data
for a secure deployment of a device without the involvement
of end users. This is particularly relevant in IoT, since non-
expert users will use such devices in their everyday lives. To
address these aspects, we propose the use of the Manufacturer
Usage Description (MUD) [8] to be part of the certificate of a
certain device or system. MUD is a recent IETF standard that
provides a mechanism for devices to signal to the network
the type of access and network functionality they require.
Therefore, network components can adapt their behavior to
enforce the access control preferences that are specified in a
device’s MUD file. On the other hand, we propose the use
of blockchain to realize the mentioned platform, in order to
provide a unified view of the security level of an IoT device
throughout its lifecycle. This information could be provided
by different sources (e.g., different Member States) through a
common EU certification scheme. While the use of blockchain
has been widely considered in the context of IoT [9] ad-
dressing challenges in different use cases, to the best of our
knowledge, this is the first work proposing a blockchain-based
platform to track the security certification of IoT devices.
The development of such blockchain-based platform to share
cybersecurity certificates represents a complementary effort
to the development of the mentioned framework, and could
improve trust and transparency aspects in the digital era.
Even though we are the first proposing platform to track
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2security assessment information about IoT devices, there sim-
ilar initiatives in other areas that are worth mentioning. The
platform proposed in this paper is similar in functionality to
the European Database on Medical Devices (EUDAMED)1
initiative, which aimed specifically at providing a repository
of information about medical devices. EUDAMED includes a
registry of manufacturers, representatives, devices, certificate
lifecycle, and vigilance information including incidents or
near-incidents that occurred during the use of a medical
device. The main difference between EUDAMED and our
proposal in this paper is the use of a decentralized blockchain-
based approach where the stakeholders can jointly manage the
cybersecurity certification information. Blockchain technology
is currently being considered in the management of official
records (e.g. academic or professional licenses) in the Block-
Certs open standard2 using a verifiable claim concept. This
concept could be used as a building block in our platform in
future production implementations.
The structure of the paper is following: Section II provides
an overview of the regulatory landscape related to cyberse-
curity certification in the EU. Then Section III describes the
basics of blockchain as the baseline for the platform proposed
in Section IV. Furthermore, Section V proposes the inclusion
of additional information to be embedded in the security
certificates to foster a secure deployment of IoT devices. A
detailed description of our proof-of-concept implementation
is given in Section VI, and Section VII concludes the paper
with an outlook about our future work in this area.
II. CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION AND EU
REGULATORY LANDSCAPE
Cybersecurity certification represents an essential instru-
ment to build a more trustworthy hyper-connected digital
landscape. Towards the realization of an EU cybersecurity
certification framework, the European Parliament adopted in
March 2019 [3] the Cybersecurity Act. This regulation pro-
poses a common umbrella for cybersecurity certification in
the EU to address the current market fragmentation through a
harmonized approach, with a view to creating a digital single
market for ICT products, services and processes. This new
regulation also establishes a roadmap for the development
of an EU framework for cybersecurity certification, with the
end goal of boosting the cybersecurity of digital products
and services in Europe. The adopted regulation identifies
cybersecurity certification as a key component to increase con-
fidence in digital solutions by defining such a framework. This
effort will further reduce the development of new (potentially
conflicting or overlapping) schemes, in order to foster the
sustainable development of the Digital Single Market.
The cybersecurity certification framework proposed by the
Cybersecurity Act is intended to embrace different cybersecu-
rity certification schemes. Therefore, the framework should be
flexible enough to accommodate different schemes that could
be focused on specific domains. Indeed, the regulation states
that the content and the format of the European cybersecurity
1http://ec.europa.eu/idabc/en/document/2256/5637.html
2https://www.blockcerts.org
certificates is one of the elements to be included in the
schemes. However, the lack of an agreed format and content
of the resulting certificate could lead to a disharmonized
coexistence of EU schemes. In this direction, the ECSO
proposes to include the certificate itself, and the certification
report in a European Cyber Security Certificate (ECSC). The
suggested content of the ECSC includes a label for simplified
understanding of the certification results, which is especially
relevant for end users. Furthermore, it is intended to include
some attributes related to the process, such as the Generalized
Protection Profile (GPP) and Generalized Security Target
(GST), which represent concepts used in the Common Criteria
standards [10].
Indeed, as already mentioned, the fragmentation of cyberse-
curity certification schemes at EU level represents a significant
challenge to be addressed by this framework. There is a need
to foster cooperation among EU Member States to achieve
a harmonized vision of cybersecurity risks in our society. In
this sense, one of the main existing efforts is represented by
the Senior Officials Group - Information Systems Security
(SOG-IS) Mutual Recognition Agreement (MRA). SOG-IS
MRA was created to foster cooperation and mutual recognition
through the standardization of CC protection profiles.
This aspect is also highlighted through the survey carried
out by ENISA in 2017 [11] regarding the development of a
cybersecurity certification framework at EU level. According
to the results of this survey, the responses of different industry
representatives emphasize the need to improve current pro-
cesses and tools for cybersecurity certification [12]. In addition
to the issues related to the high cost and long duration of
the certification process, the results highlight the concerns
regarding the need for mutual recognition at EU level for
products and services. Another key aspect is the need to have
self-declaration schemes based on a self-assessment process
to cope with a fast moving market. Indeed, this is also
contemplated by the Cybersecurity Act [3], which specifies
that the manufacturer or provider shall assume the respon-
sibility for the compliance of the product in case of using
a self-assessment process. An additional point was stressed
regarding the need for certification and labelling processes
in the IoT domain, due to its ubiquitous nature and required
interoperability across different platforms.
According to the Cybersecurity Act [3], as the result of a
successful evaluation of an ICT product, service, or process,
a cybersecurity certificate is issued depending on a certain
assurance level. This level represents a basis for confidence
that an ICT product, service or process meets the security
requirements of a certain scheme. The value of the assurance
level could be “basic”, “substantial” and “high”, and it aims to
provide the corresponding rigor and depth of the evaluation. It
represents one of the elements to be defined by each European
cybersecurity certification scheme. Furthermore, the regulation
also defines supplementary cybersecurity information to be
provided by the manufacturer or provider in electronic format,
including guidelines and recommendations about the use of
the product or service to end users, contact information of
the manufacturer or provider, as well as a reference to an
online repository listing publicly disclosed vulnerabilities. In
3this direction, as will be described in Section V, we consider
the inclusion of guidelines and recommendations by using the
recent MUD standard, which defines a format to define the
intended use of a specific device or system. Furthermore, the
use of blockchain in our architecture presented in Section IV
is intended to support the mentioned online repository.
The adopted regulation also identifies the following set
of roles to be considered in the cybersecurity certification
ecosystem:
• National Cybersecurity Certification Authority (NCCA):
among other aspects, this is the entity responsible for the
supervision, enforcement, monitoring of the compliance
of ICT products, services or processes with the require-
ments of the corresponding certificates. They also monitor
and enforce the obligations of manufacturers established
in their territories, as well to assist the national accredita-
tion bodies in the supervision of conformity assessment
bodies;
• Conformity Assessment Body (CAB): it is in charge of
performing a conformity assessment process for evalu-
ating whether specified requirements of a certain ICT
product, service, or process have been fulfilled. They are
accredited by a national accreditation body under certain
requirements A CAB is intended to issue European cy-
bersecurity certificates referring to assurance level basic
or substantial. In the case of level high, they must be
issue by a NCCA, or a CAB under specific conditions;
• European Cybersecurity Certification Group (ECCG): the
ECCG is intended to be composed by representatives
of different NCCAs to advise and assist the EC in
cybersecurity certification aspects.
Based on these roles, we propose a blockchain-based plat-
form, which is intended to foster a trusted and transparent
sharing process of the cybersecurity certification results of
devices and products. Details of such a platform are provided
in Section IV
III. BLOCKCHAIN-BASED DISTRIBUTED LEDGERS
In this section we describe the Ethereum Virtual Machine
(EVM) [13], which is a Blockchain-based Distributed Ledger
Platform used as a building block in the solution proposed in
this paper. The EVM is currently used in a public blockchain
instance where anyone with a computer connected to the
Internet can submit and validate transaction blocks. The EVM
addresses many challenges including synchronization issues,
security, and soundness of the distributed protocol. In this
section we limit ourselves to the high-level description of the
EVM from a user perspective including design choices for
systems using the EVM as a building block without presenting
details about how these challenges were addressed.
Blockchain implementations based on the EVM can be
primarily used to keep a decentralized record of transactions
that are associated to a virtual currency (ETH), which are
essentially transfers of balances from a source to a target
user account. In addition to virtual currency transactions,
the EVM can also be used to deploy custom software in
the blockchain, usually referred to as smart contracts, or to
trigger the execution of functions in the deployed contracts.
An EVM blockchain instance can be defined as a distributed
database of blocks of transactions managed by nodes that do
not necessarily trust each other and do not share a common
trusted third party.
In the EVM there are three types of nodes: clients, full nodes
that act as observers and store the complete blockchain, and
full nodes that act as transaction validators and block builders
(a.k.a. miner nodes). Client nodes submit transactions to miner
nodes, which are responsible for assembling blocks containing
a set of validated transactions, for which a cryptographic
puzzle must be solved as a proof-of-work consensus. The first
miner node to successfully solve the puzzle broadcasts the
block of transactions including the answer to the puzzle to
all other full nodes, which then verify/accept the block and
start working on the next block. As a reward, the miner node
receives a fixes amount of virtual currency and also collects
fees for the transactions included in the block. Each block
of transactions include a reference to the previous block, in
order to ensure the integrity and immutability properties since
any change to a previous mined block would invalidate the
references on all blocks mined afterwards. The first block for
a specific blockchain instance must be pre-agreed between the
miner nodes and is called the genesis block.
Client nodes must sign all transactions submitted using a
randomly generated private key, which is used to derive their
public key and EVM public address identifier. The same type
of identifier is also used for smart contracts, however, contracts
do not hold a private/public key pair since they are stored
in the public blocks. Smart contracts are simply assigned a
random identifier when they are deployed, which is used for
future reference. EVM public addresses are not verified by any
means and clients are free to generate new random addresses
any time they wish to prevent linkability of their transactions.
Smart contracts in the EVM are stateful turing-complete
programs implemented using a custom language named So-
lidity3. From a practical perspective smart contracts in the
EVM are very simple and can be implemented using a very
restrictive number of instructions, data structures, and events.
Therefore, in most cases, smart contracts simply act as simple
registers of verified information that is made available on
databases out of the blockchain.
The EVM by design targets the implementation of public
blockchain instances, however, other alternative deployments
are possibly namely a semi-public consortium or private. The
choice of the type of deployment impacts on the access
control, auditability, and censorship resistance properties since
it regulates who is allowed to submit transaction, validate
transactions/blocks, and observe full log of transactions [14].
In this paper we propose to use a public blockchain and we
propose identity management smart contracts to be used in
order to allow some level of assurance on the identification of
the different stakeholders. For example, it is important to be
able to reliably identify device owners, device manufacturers,
EU Member State authorities, and Conformity Assessment
3https://ethereum.github.io/browser-solidity/
4Bodies. Details about our approach are introduced in the
following section.
IV. USING BLOCKCHAIN FOR TRUSTED SHARING OF
CYBERSECURITY ASSESSMENT INFORMATION
In this section, we present the design of a blockchain-based
platform for trusted sharing of cybersecurity certification infor-
mation. This platform consists of smart contracts for identity
management and device registry deployed in a blockchain-
based virtual machine. The platform is not specific for any
particular cybersecurity certification information and can be
used without major changes for other types of information as
needed.
The primary goal of this platform is to be used at EU level
when device manufacturers and conformity assessment bodies
are distributed across different Member State countries. For
example, if a device manufacturer located in Spain wants to
sell a device to consumers in Germany that was certified by
a Conformity Assessment Body located in Italy there should
be a way of ensuring reliable identification and exchange of
cybersecurity assurance information. A secondary application
of our platform is to track the supply chain of the device parts
and software components also considering manufacturer and
assessment bodies outside of the EU.
Figure 1 presents the architecture elements including a
sequence of activities. The first step is for the manufacturer of
the IoT device to create a smart contract that acts as a registry
for authoritative device information that is published in an off-
chain database (activities 1 and 2). This smart contract contains
various information including, for example, the manufacturer
name, contact information, identity certificate, device type,
device id, last firmware version and hash/fingerprint, and a
MUD file describing the typical network interactions (see
Subsection V-A). A Conformity Assessment Body is able
to access the smart contract and update it by adding infor-
mation about a cybersecurity assessment certificate, which
is also published in an off-chain database (activities 3 and
4). When an IoT device is deployed in a Smart Space, the
local infrastructure, after authenticating the device (activity
5), can then retrieve any relevant device information using
a Blockchain Client that is kept in sync with the current state
of the device registry Smart Contract (activities 6 and 7). The
Blockchain Client or local Infrastructure may then also retrieve
any information from the off-chain database as needed to setup
the IoT device or to inform the Device Consumer about the
device features, capabilities, and cybersecurity certificates and
labels. The Blockchain Client may also act as a point of entry
for any information the Device Consumer may want to publish
about the device, for example, any user experience issues or
vulnerability information.
In the architecture presented in Figure 1, no precise details
are presented about the identification and authentication of
all stakeholders. However, this is an important aspect of the
solution we propose. Device Manufacturers and Certifica-
tion Authorities are expected to be dispersed over all EU
Member States, following a common standard for publishing
information about IoT Devices and Cybersecurity Certificates
(See Section II). In order to ensure a global EU registry
of manufacturers and certification authorities we propose a
hierarchical approach where an EU Identification Service is
responsible for issuing certificates for each Member State
Certification Authority, which is in charge of issuing certifi-
cates for their national device manufacturers and conformity
assessment bodies. The Device Manufacturer is then in charge
of providing identification information for the IoT Device
and for verified device consumers, meaning that these are
consumers that in fact own a specific IoT device type/model.
By registering the identification information using a newly
generated blockchain identity, the actual identity of the device
consumer is anonymized meaning that, for each owned device,
the device consumer uses an independent identity. By adopting
this anonymization approach it is not possible to derive from
the blockchain all devices owned by a specific Consumer even
if multiple device manufacturers collude.
The platform proposed in this paper relies on public
blockchain implementation, however, considering the transac-
tion fees and the typical limited transaction throughput, this
may not be the optimal approach. Our focus on this paper
is on the design of the platform and a proof-of-concept pro-
totype implementation. Practical deployment design choices
including the possible adoption of a semi-public/consortium
blockchain implementation are part of our future work.
V. ENRICHING CYBERSECURITY CERTIFICATION IN IOT
As a result of a successful cybersecurity evaluation, a
cybersecurity certificate should be issued by the corresponding
authority. The regulation defines this term as a “document
issued by a relevant body, attesting that a given ICT product,
ICT service or ICT process has been evaluated for compliance
with specific security requirements laid down in a European
cybersecurity certification scheme”. The content to be included
in this certificate should help to make informed choices taking
into account the expected technical level of end users.
Indeed, in the IoT context, non-expert users should be able
to understand the security level provided by a certain ICT
component. Furthermore, they should be entitled to access the
information related to the certification scheme, including the
assurance level and associated risks, as well as regarding the
expected updates or patches for that component. Consequently,
there is a need to define a transparent approach to empower
users with the ability to access the information about the
cybersecurity of their ICT products, services, and processes.
In addition, the regulation also proposes guidance on action
or setting that the end user can implement to maintain or
increase the cybersecurity of a certain component. Again, such
guidelines must consider the involvement of non-expert users,
who could be opposed to adopt them.
Beyond these general aspects, below we describe some
potential aspects to be part of the European cybersecurity
certificate by considering the specifics of the IoT context.
These elements are intended to ease a secure and automated
deployment of IoT devices.
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A. Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
The goal of the Manufacturer Usage Description (MUD)
standard [8] is to define a format and message exchange for
end devices to signal access control lists to the network where
they are deployed. The specification of these access control
lists are specified by manufacturers in a MUD file by using a
Yet Another Next Generation (YANG) model [15] to describe
the intended behavior of a certain device. Consequently, the
deployment of MUD files could reduce the threat and vul-
nerability surface of a device to the communications defined
by the manufacturer. Furthermore, it gives a certain degree
of extensibility, so that manufacturer can express other device
requirements.
MUD could cover a gap in the scope of security certifica-
tion, in order to support a secure and automated deployment
of IoT devices. In particular, according to the Cybersecurity
Act (Article 55), the manufacturer or provider shall make
publicly available (among other things) “guidance and recom-
mendations to assist end users with the secure configuration,
installation, deployment, operation and maintenance of the
ICT products or ICT services;”. In this direction, the use of
MUD files could also help to reduce the users involvement
when installing and deploying new IoT devices. The MUD
standard is also strongly considered by the NIST in recent
reports to mitigate network-based attacks in IoT [16].
B. Vulnerability Disclosure
Throughout their lifecycle, new potential vulnerabilities
could be detected in a certain device or product. In this
direction, a coordinated vulnerability disclosure strategy could
increase users trust in the digital era, through the coopera-
tion between manufacturers, governments and organizations.
Indeed, according the Cybersecurity Act, such cooperation
has been proven to significantly increase both the rate of
discovery and the remedy of vulnerabilities. Furthermore, it
6states certain conditions for the process, in which the manufac-
turer or provider has the “opportunity to diagnose and remedy
the vulnerability before detailed vulnerability information is
disclosed to third parties or to the public”
Aligned with the need for “facilitating the access to better-
structured information on cybersecurity risks and possible
remedies”, the use of a blockchain-based platform could
help to track the state of a newly disclosed vulnerability.
For instance, a certain organization could add a hash of the
vulnerability to the blockchain that is encrypted to be only
accessible to the manufacturer. Then, after a certain period,
such organization could report the status of the vulnerability
to the corresponding NCCA.
A related aspect with the vulnerability disclosure process is
the lack of a vulnerability database in the EU. This database
could consider the existing National Vulnerability Database
(NVD) [17] in the U.S. We believe that such EU database
could be integrated as part of the proposed blockchain-based
platform to foster the cooperation and coordination among
Member States through a centralized point to share products
vulnerabilities that are marketed at EU level.
C. System modeling and testing processes
As part of the cybersecurity information, a detailed struc-
tural and behavior models of IoT components [18] could help
to come up with a more clear understanding about potential
security risks. This information could be based on the use
of Model-Based Testing (MBT) [19], which we have been
considered in our previous works for the development of a
risk-based security testing and assessment methodology for
IoT [7]. Indeed, such models are used for the generation of
tests to be executed in the device. Then, the results of these
tests (test report) are employed for estimating the risk of
potential vulnerabilities.
In this case, the use of blockchain could also help to repre-
sent the relationship between different devices or components;
indeed, the security level of a certain device could affect to
the security provided by a whole system. Thus, blockchain
could support the tracking of the components’ security level,
as well as the relationship among them. An additional aspect
is the inclusion of test results, which are employed to evaluate
and certificate the security level of a certain component. While
testing processes are already considered by the Cybersecurity
Act (e.g., through penetration testing), there is a lack of
standard mechanisms to represent the test report (and the tests
themselves) in a readable-machine way, so that such tests can
be re-executed and analyzed throughout the devices’ lifecycle.
VI. CASE STUDY AND IMPLEMENTATION
In this section we present a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation of our blockchain-based platform described in the
previous section. As a case study we consider the retrieval of
a MUD file reference from the device registry smart contract
by a Software Defined Network (SDN) controller. A diagram
of the implementation scenario is presented in Figure 3. The
SDN controller authenticates the IoT device (step 1), verifies
the device identity using the Manufacturer Identification smart
contract (step 2), and fetchs the MUD file reference from the
Device Registry contract (step 3). The MUD file reference
is then used to fetch the actual MUD file from an off-chain
database (step 4), which is used by the SDN controller to
configure access control policies for the deployed IoT device.
By adopting our blockchain-based platform transparency and
auditability of this information increases the reliability and
security.
c o n t r a c t I d e n t i f i c a t i o n A u t h o r i t h y {
address p u b l i c owner ;
s t r i n g p u b l i c ownerName ;
s t r i n g p u b l i c o w n e r C e r t i f i c a t e ;
event C e r t i f i c a t e I s s u e d (
address indexed owner ,
s t r i n g indexed ownerName ,
s t r i n g indexed subjec tName ,
s t r i n g s u b j e c t C e r t i f i c a t e ) ;
c o n s t r u c t o r ( address owner ,
s t r i n g memory ownerName ,
s t r i n g memory o w n e r C e r t i f i c a t e ) p u b l i c {
owner = owner ;
ownerName = ownerName ;
o w n e r C e r t i f i c a t e = o w n e r C e r t i f i c a t e ;
}
m o d i f i e r onlyOwner ( ) {
r e q u i r e ( msg . s e n d e r == owner ) ; ;
}
f u n c t i o n i s s u e C e r t i f i c a t e (
s t r i n g c a l l d a t a subjec tName ,
s t r i n g c a l l d a t a s u b j e c t C e r t i f i c a t e )
e x t e r n a l onlyOwner {
emi t C e r t i f i c a t e I s s u e d ( msg . sende r , ownerName ,
subjec tName , s u b j e c t C e r t i f i c a t e ) ;
}
f u n c t i o n r e v o k e C e r t i f i c a t e ( . . . ) {
}
Listing 1. Identity management contract
The manufacturer identification and device registry smart
contracts were implemented using the EVM (see Section III)
in a private blockchain deployment for evalutation purposes.
The manufacturer identification contract is an instance of the
general purpose identification authority contract described in
Listing 1, where some implementation details were omitted
due to space restrictions. This same contract can be instanti-
ated by the EU Identification Authority, National Certification
Authority of each Member State, and Device Manufacturers
as introduced in Figure 2. The use of a smart contract for
identity management is a clear advantage since it is similar
to a log-based Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), which allows
transparency with respect to the issuance of identity assurance
certificates [20].
Listing 2 shows the device registry contract. This contract
is created by the manufacturer for each new device type
and defines a registerFile function that can only be invoked
by the manufacturer or a assessment body also specified by
the manufacturer. All the history of the device registry is
kept in the blockchain since it can only be modified by
function invocations done through transactions. Details about
the vulnerability disclosure functions and functions to collect
feedback from end-users to establish a device reputation were
omitted due to space restrictions.
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c o n t r a c t D e v i c e R e g i s t r y {
address p u b l i c m a n u f a c t u r e r ;
s t r i n g p u b l i c manufac turerName ;
address p u b l i c m a n u f a c t u r e r I d C o n t r a c t ;
s t r i n g p u b l i c d e v i c e I d ;
address p u b l i c assessmen tBody ;
s t r i n g p u b l i c assessmentBodyName ;
address p u b l i c a s s e s s m e n t B o d y I d C o n t r a c t ;
event R e g i s t e r F i l e (
address sende r ,
s t r i n g indexed d e v i c e I d ,
s t r i n g indexed f i l e T y p e ,
s t r i n g indexed f i l e L o c a t i o n ,
bytes32 f i l e H a s h ) ;
c o n s t r u c t o r ( address m a n u f a c t u r e r ,
s t r i n g memory manufacturerName ,
address m a n u f a c t u r e r I d C o n t r a c t ,
s t r i n g memory d e v i c e I d ) p u b l i c {
m a n u f a c t u r e r = m a n u f a c t u r e r ;
a s ses smen tBody = m a n u f a c t u r e r ;
manufac turerName = manufac turerName ;
m a n u f a c t u r e r I d C o n t r a c t = m a n u f a c t u r e r I d C o n t r a c t ;
d e v i c e I d = d e v i c e I d ; }
m o d i f i e r o n l y M a n u f a c t u r e r ( ) {
r e q u i r e ( msg . s e n d e r == m a n u f a c t u r e r ) ; ; }
m o d i f i e r onlyAssessmentBody ( ) {
r e q u i r e ( msg . s e n d e r == assessmen tBody ) ; ; }
f u n c t i o n se tAsses smen tBody ( address assessmentBody ,
s t r i n g c a l l d a t a assessmentBodyName ,
address a s s e s s m e n t B o d y I d C o n t r a c t ) e x t e r n a l
o n l y M a n u f a c t u r e r {
assessmen tBody = assessmen tBody ;
assessmentBodyName = assessmentBodyName ;
a s s e s s m e n t B o d y I d C o n t r a c t = a s s e s s m e n t B o d y I d C o n t r a c t ;
}
f u n c t i o n r e g i s t e r F i l e ( s t r i n g c a l l d a t a f i l e T y p e ,
s t r i n g c a l l d a t a f i l e L o c a t i o n ,
bytes32 f i l e H a s h
) e x t e r n a l o n l y M a n u f a c t u r e r on lyAssessmentBody {
emi t R e g i s t e r F i l e ( msg . sende r , d e v i c e I d , f i l e T y p e ,
f i l e L o c a t i o n , f i l e H a s h ) ; }
}
Listing 2. Device registry contract
Finally, Listing 3 shows a MUD file example for a tem-
perature sensor that was stored in an off-chain database
and registered in the device registry smart contract using
the registerF ile function (see Listing 2). According to the
MUD Model [8], the ietf-mud container includes different
parameters, such as the URL where the MUD file can be
downloaded, or the date of the last update. It also contains
the name of the access control lists, which are specified in the
ietf-access-control-list container. In this case, the ACL mud-
37547-v6to restricts the access to the device and the ACL mud-
37547-v6fr restricts the access from the device. Such access
control lists are intended to allow the communication with
devices from the same manufacturer (manufacturerA), through
the ports 33 and 12 and using the UDP protocol (coded as 17).
{” i e t f−mud : mud” : {
”mud−v e r s i o n ” : 1 ,
”mud−u r l ” : ” h t t p s : / / h o s t 1 / model1 ” ,
” l a s t−u p d a t e ” : ”2019−05−16T09 : 0 3 : 4 6 + 0 0 : 0 0 ” ,
” cache−v a l i d i t y ” : 48 ,
” i s−s u p p o r t e d ” : true ,
” s y s t e m i n f o ” : ” Tempera tu r e s e n s o r ” ,
”mfg−name” : ” manufac tu r e rA ” ,
” d o c u m e n t a t i o n ” : ” h t t p s : / / www. d o c u m e n t a t i o n . o rg ” ,
” model−name” : ” model1 ” ,
” from−dev i ce−p o l i c y ” : {
” a c c e s s− l i s t s ” : {
” a c c e s s− l i s t ” : [{ ”name” : ”mud−37547−v 6 f r ”}]}} ,
” to−dev i ce−p o l i c y ” : {
” a c c e s s− l i s t s ” : {” a c c e s s− l i s t ” : [{ ”name” : ”mud
−37547−v6 to ” }]}}} ,
” i e t f−a c c e s s−c o n t r o l− l i s t : a c l s ” : { ” a c l ” : [{
”name” : ”mud−37547−v 6 f r ” ,
” t y p e ” : ” ipv6−a c l−t y p e ” ,
” a c e s ” : { ” ace ” : [{
”name” : ”myman0−f r d e v ” ,
” matches ” : { ” i e t f−mud : mud” : {
” same−m a n u f a c t u r e r ” : ” manufac tu r e rA ” } ,
” i pv6 ” : { ” p r o t o c o l ” : 17 } ,
” udp ” : {
” d e s t i n a t i o n−p o r t ” : {
” o p e r a t o r ” : ” eq ” , ” p o r t ” : 33} ,
” sou rce−p o r t ” : {
” o p e r a t o r ” : ” eq ” , ” p o r t ” : 12}}} ,
” a c t i o n s ” : {” f o r w a r d i n g ” : ” a c c e p t ” }}]}}]}}
Listing 3. ”MUD File Example”
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Cybersecurity certification represents a cornerstone in the
landscape at EU level. Although the definition of a certification
framework sets out significant challenges, its realization is
expected to increase users’ trust in the digital era. One of the
most significant needs is due to the lack of a common platform
to share cybersecurity information in a secure and transparent
way. We believe that our proposed blockchain-based approach
is intended to serve as a referece point where manufacturers,
end users and organizations could get access and update the
certification information of IoT devices. As future work we
8propose to investigate two improvements to the approach
proposed in this paper. Firstly, we plan to implement the pro-
posed architecture using Hyperledger following a hierarchical
sharding approach where the blockchain is not anymore a
centralized data structure but is split in multiple layers where
each layer above acts as a synchronization point. Secondly,
we plan to integrate this approach to our previous work where
data usage control policies were deployed and evaluated in
smart contracts [21], with an additional feature where devices
can verify policy decisions using a lightweight blockchain
synchronization protocols (e.g. Ethereum light node protocol
[22]) without relying on external entities. Our goal with these
two improvements is to provide a fully decentralized approach
for cybersecurity management of IoT devices, which after
evaluation could be generalized to any type of device, product,
or service in line with the current EU legislative documents.
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